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YOU AIN’T SEEN NOTHIN’ YET: THE INEVITABLE POST-
HAMDAN CONFLICT BETWEEN THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE POLITICAL BRANCHES
MICHAEL GREENBERGER*
On September 21, 2006, my colleagues, Professors Singer, Quint,
and Young, and I led a workshop for our faculty on the Supreme
Court’s last, and most important, case of the previous Term, Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld.1  As was doubtless true of law scholars across the country
(indeed, perhaps throughout the world), we expressed wonderment
about the sweep of the decision.  In Hamdan, a conservative Court,
having just been joined by two conservative appointees named by a
conservative President (known for attempting a dramatic expansion of
his Article II war powers authority)2 and confirmed by a conservative
Republican-controlled Senate (known for accommodating the Presi-
dent’s Article II authority even at the expense of its own constitutional
prerogatives),3 had accepted the arguments of Osama Bin Laden’s al-
leged bodyguard and driver that one of President Bush’s asserted
principal tools in the “war on terror,” i.e., the executive branch’s uni-
lateral establishment of military tribunals, was constitutionally defec-
tive.4  On a 5-3 vote, the Court held, in essence, that the President’s
military commission procedures inadequately protected accused ter-
Copyright  2007 by Michael Greenberger.
* Law School Professor, University of Maryland School of Law; Director, University of
Maryland Center for Health and Homeland Security (CHHS); B.A., Lafayette College; J.D.,
University of Pennsylvania.  The author wishes to thank CHHS Associate Director Erin
Hahn, J.D., CHHS Staff Attorney Deborah Silver, J.D., and current University of Maryland
School of Law students Anthony Villa, Colleen Clary, Nicole Chapple, and Jason Zap-
pasodi, for their assistance in the preparation of this Essay.
1. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
2. See Harold Hongju Koh, Setting The World Right, 115 YALE L.J. 2350, 2356–60 (2006).
3. See Michael Greenberger, The Missing Link: Congress Has Shirked Its Constitutional
Duties and Floundered in the War on Terror, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Sept.–Oct. 2005, at 32, 32–33.
4. Justice Kennedy emphasized in his concurring opinion, the President’s actions
were unconstitutional under Justice Jackson’s now famous Steel Seizure tripartite analysis,
because the President’s powers as Commander in Chief do not trump Congress when the
latter has expressly prohibited the presidential actions at issue. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at
2800–08 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).  While Justice Stevens only references Jackson’s
Steel Seizure trilogy in a footnote, id. at 2774 n.23 (majority opinion), his opinion is also
clearly based fundamentally on separation of powers issues. See Jana Singer, Hamdan as an
Assertion of Judicial Power, 66 MD. L. REV. 759, 767 (2007); Peter E. Quint, Silences and Pecu-
liarities of the Hamdan Opinions, 66 MD. L. REV. 772, 772 (2007); Gordon G. Young, Youngs-
town, Hamdan, and “Inherent” Emergency Presidential Policymaking Powers, 66 MD. L. REV. 787,
796–98 (2007).
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rorists, thereby reversing a panel of the D.C. Circuit in which Chief
Justice Roberts, then sitting as a circuit judge, had joined.5
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF HAMDAN
A. The Merits
As my colleagues explain in detail elsewhere in the accompanying
essays,6 the five Justices composing the Hamdan majority (through an
opinion of the Court by Justice Stevens and a concurring opinion of
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) held
that, in establishing the military commission system by unilateral Exec-
utive Order, the President ran afoul of controlling congressional re-
strictions within the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).7  He
did so by violating: (1) the UCMJ’s “uniformity requirement,” i.e., mil-
itary commissions must parallel the highly protective procedures for
the accused within courts-martial proceedings in the absence of a
finding of “impracticability,” a finding never made by the President;8
and (2) the part of the UCMJ which the Court found incorporated
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, requiring the Presi-
dent’s tribunals to embody the characteristics of “regularly constituted
court[s].”9  The Hamdan majority found the military commissions at
issue so laden with procedural defects that they violated Common Ar-
ticle 3.10
The latter holding concerning the Geneva Conventions was noth-
ing short of stunning.  From the day the Bush Administration opened
the Guantanamo Bay detention facility on January 11, 2002,11 it made
clear that combatants in the “war on terror” were not entitled to the
5. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
6. See Singer, supra note 4, at 759; Quint, supra note 4, at 781–82; Young, supra note 4, R
at 797.
7. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2000).
8. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2790–92; id. at 2801, 2804 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
9. Id. at 2796–97 (majority opinion); id. at 2803–04, 2807 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part).
10. Id. at 2796–97, 2798 (majority opinion); see also id. at 2803–04 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in part).
11. The first detainees arrived at the detention center at Guantanamo Bay on January
11, 2002. See Carol D. Leonnig & Julie Tate, Some at Guantanamo Mark 5 Years in Limbo; Big
Questions About Low-Profile Inmates, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2007, at A1; see also Steve Vogel,
U.S. Takes Hooded, Shackled Detainees to Cuba, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2002, at A10 (“20 al
Qaeda and Taliban detainees were flown out of Afghanistan on a U.S. military aircraft
yesterday, the first of hundreds of prisoners from the war expected to be sent to the U.S.
Navy base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for interrogation and possible trial.”).
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protections of the Geneva Conventions.12  Prior to Hamdan, the ma-
jority of courts that ruled on this issue had agreed that the Conven-
tions either did not apply or that, if they did apply, they were not “self-
executing,”13 i.e., detainees had no right to bring actions to enforce
their rights under the Conventions.14  Because the Hamdan majority
had already held that the military commissions violated the “uniform-
ity requirement” of the UCMJ, it had no need to reach the Geneva
Convention issue.  However, not only did it do so, but, without ruling
on whether these treaties are self-executing, the Hamdan majority
found that these treaties were incorporated within the UCMJ’s re-
quirement that commissions abide by the “laws of war,”15 and, as so
incorporated, Common Article 3 fully applied to the accused ter-
rorists at issue.16  Not a single court to confront the issue, whether
finding Common Article 3 apt or not, had ever considered the fact
that the UCMJ incorporated these treaties.  Justice Stevens cited no
judicial precedent on point.
12. Memorandum from President George W. Bush to Vice President Richard Cheney
et al. (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/docu-
ments/020702bush.pdf (“I also accept the legal conclusion . . . that common Article 3 of
Geneva does not apply to either al Qaeda or Taliban detainees . . .  [and] I determine that
the Taliban detainees are unlawful combatants and, therefore, do not qualify as prisoners
of war under Article 4 of Geneva.”); see also Michael Greenberger, A ‘Third’ Magna Carta,
NAT’L L.J., Aug. 2, 2004, at S7 (noting that the Bush Administration had branded the
detainees as “enemy combatants” who were not entitled to Geneva protections because
they had violated the “laws of war” through irregular fighting methods).
13. For a full description of the origin and use of the term “self executing” in reference
to treaties, see Quint, supra note 4, at 777–78. R
14. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“We therefore hold that
the 1949 Geneva Convention does not confer upon Hamdan a right to enforce its provi-
sions in court.”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 468 (4th Cir. 2003) (noting that “the
Geneva Convention is not self-executing”); Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002)
(holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider claims under international law),
aff’d sub nom. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1144–45 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding
that “[detainees] cannot seek release based on violations of the Constitution or treaties or
federal law; the courts are not open to them.  Whatever other relief the detainees seek,
their claims . . . are . . . beyond the jurisdiction of the federal courts.”), rev’d sub nom. Rasul
v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). But see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 165
(D.D.C. 2004) (finding that the Geneva Convention was self-executing and that its protec-
tions applied to Hamdan); In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 478–79
(D.D.C. 2005) (concluding that the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions are self-execut-
ing, relying on the reasoning from Hamdan), vacated sub nom. Boumediene v. Bush, 476
F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007).
15. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2794; see also 10 U.S.C. § 818 (2000) (“General courts-martial
also have jurisdiction to try any person who by the law of war is subject to trial by a military
tribunal and may adjudge any punishment permitted by the law of war.”).
16. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795–96 (rejecting the lower court’s reasoning that the com-
batants in Guantanamo were not engaged in the kind of conflict that is covered by Com-
mon Article 3).
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B. The Far-Reaching Implication of the Merits
As Professor Singer notes in her accompanying essay,17 the
Hamdan majority’s holding pertaining to the Geneva Conventions had
important consequences far beyond the legitimacy of military commis-
sions.  Those treaties may have broad implications for the manner in
which captured combatants are classified,18 interrogated,19 and other-
wise treated.20  Violations of the Conventions constitute criminal con-
duct in violation of the federal War Crimes Act.21  Hence, reversal of
the Bush Administration’s doctrine that the Geneva Conventions did
not apply to the Guantanamo detainees suddenly raised the prospect
that any mistreatment by government interrogators, most especially
malpractices going back to the opening of the Guantanamo facility,
could lead to felony prosecutions in United States federal courts.  As
Professor Singer aptly speculates,22 the Hamdan majority, in reaching
out to make these treaties apt, could hardly have been unaware of the
broad significance of that holding.
17. Singer, supra note 4, at 764–65. R
18. See Hamdan, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 161–62 (discussing Article 5 of the Third Geneva
Convention, which provides that if there is any doubt whether those captured were operat-
ing under the laws of war, they should receive the protections of the Convention until their
proper status is determined by a competent tribunal).  In the Hamdan district court opin-
ion, Judge James Robertson relied on Article 5 to conclude that “[t]here is nothing in this
record to suggest that a competent tribunal has determined that Hamdan is not a prisoner-
of-war under the Geneva Conventions. . . .  Until or unless such a [competent] tribunal
decides otherwise, Hamdan has, and must be accorded, the full protections of a prisoner-
of-war.” Id. at 162.  Judge Robertson’s reliance on Article 5 in ruling that Hamdan was not
given a proper status hearing demonstrates the type of implication that treaty provisions
may have on the classification schemes for captured combatants.
19. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3(1)(c),
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3319–20, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 138 [hereinafter Third Geneva
Convention] (prohibiting “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment”).
20. See id. art. 25 (providing that “[p]risoners of war shall be quartered under condi-
tions as favourable as those for the forces of the Detaining Power . . . .  Said conditions
shall make allowance for the habits and customs of the prisoners.”); id. art. 26 (providing
that prisoners of war should receive basic food rations and that their habitual diets should
be taken into account); id. art. 27 (“Clothing, underwear and footwear shall be supplied to
prisoners of war in sufficient quantities . . . .”); id. art. 29 (requiring the Detaining Power to
“take all sanitary measures necessary to ensure the cleanliness and healthfulness of camps
and to prevent epidemics”); id. art. 30 (requiring adequate infirmary for prisoners of war);
id. art. 38 (“The Detaining Power shall encourage the practice of intellectual, educational,
and recreational pursuits, sports and games amongst prisoners, and shall take the mea-
sures necessary to ensure the exercise thereof.”); id. art. 48 (providing for procedures re-
garding mail and parcel transfer to new addresses in the event of transfer).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
22. See Singer, supra note 4, at 764. R
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C. Overcoming Procedural Hurdles to Reach the Merits
As Professor Singer also observes in her accompanying piece,23
perhaps even more astonishing than the substantive holdings of the
Hamdan majority is its rejection of a series of threshold jurisdictional
issues, any one of which would have allowed the Court to avoid ruling
on the highly controversial issues embodying the merits.  At least one
of those issues seemed to have substantial stopping power.  After certi-
orari had been granted in Hamdan, Congress passed the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA),24 a critical portion of which was de-
signed to overrule legislatively the Court’s 2004 decision in Rasul v.
Bush.25  Rasul, reversing a unanimous panel in the D.C. Circuit, held
that the Guantanamo Bay detainees, even though aliens held outside
the sovereign United States in Cuba, had the right to bring habeas
actions in federal district courts under the controlling habeas stat-
ute.26  Almost as an afterthought, Congress, through the DTA, which
was principally designed to impose Geneva-like limits on controversial
Bush Administration interrogation tactics, amended the governing
habeas statute to bar habeas actions and to prohibit detainees from
even challenging the very interrogation tactics outlawed by that stat-
ute.27  Certainly the authors of the habeas bar within the DTA had
thought that the language of that statute clearly applied to cases pend-
ing at the time of DTA passage, such as Hamdan.28
However, the Hamdan majority, deftly employing a series of ca-
nons of statutory construction, found that the DTA’s habeas bar did
not apply to pending cases,29 and thus enabling the majority to reach
the merits in Hamdan.  As Professor Singer suggests,30 the majority’s
circumnavigation of the DTA language is an important sign of the
majority’s commitment to resolving the substance of the constitu-
23. See id. at 761–62.
24. Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000dd to 2000dd-1).
25. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
26. For a full description of the Rasul decision, see Greenberger, supra note 12. R
27. § 1005(e), 119 Stat. at 2741–43.
28. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2816 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing statements made by Senators during the DTA’s passage and concluding that
“[t]hese statements were made when Members of Congress were fully aware that our con-
tinuing jurisdiction over this very case was at issue”).
29. See id. at 2769 (majority opinion) (finding that “Congress here expressly provided
that subsections (e)(2) and (e)(3) [of the DTA] applied to pending cases”).
30. See Singer, supra note 4, at 763–64. R
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tional and statutory issues before it adversely to the  Bush
Administration.31
D. The Hamdan Dissents
The three separate dissenting opinions,32 each joined in by all
three of the dissenters (Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito), vigorously
articulated the various doctrines of deference that both the Court and
Congress should pay to the President, acting as Commander in Chief,
that conventional wisdom had expected from the Court as a whole.
The dissenters did so by accepting the plethora of arguments ad-
vanced by the Bush Administration that the Court had no jurisdiction
over the matter,33 and that, even if the merits could be reached, the
President was acting lawfully within the scope of his constitutional
powers—powers that should be unfettered by statute or international
treaty.34  Because the Chief Justice had sat on the lower court panel,
he recused himself from Hamdan.  However, had he been able to rule,
31. Of course, it is true, as Justice Stevens acknowledges in his opinion, that had the
Court found that the DTA stripped it of jurisdiction to hear the Hamdan case, the Court
would have been required to address the constitutionality of such a measure. See Hamdan,
126 S. Ct. at 2769 n.15; Singer, supra note 4, at 762–63. On the other hand, whether five R
Justices would coalesce around a finding that such a statute is unconstitutional is certainly
an open question, and the early lower court rulings on this issue have not offered a reason
for optimism over such an argument.  In December 2006, Judge James Robertson of the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that the MCA was clear in
denying Guantanamo detainees the use of habeas corpus and he found the statute consti-
tutional.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d 9, 11–13, 19 (D.D.C. 2006).  An even more
recent ruling by the D.C. Circuit also held that provisions of the MCA strip foreign nation-
als held as enemy combatants of the right to file habeas petitions challenging their deten-
tion.  Much like Judge Robertson’s December 2006 Hamdan opinion, the D.C. Circuit
relied on Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 762 (1950), to support the finding that there exists
no common law or constitutional right to habeas corpus for aliens captured outside of the
United States, therefore the MCA is not an unconstitutional suspension of the writ.
Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 990–92 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007).
Both opinions essentially stated that when Congress enacted the new MCA and it ad-
dressed retroactive habeas claims, “Congress and the president had undone the basis of
the Supreme Court’s ruling” in Hamdan.  Neil A. Lewis, Judge Sets Back Guantanamo Detain-
ees, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2006, at A4. But see Boumediene, 127 S. Ct. at 1479 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting that the reasoning of Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
466 (2004), that the federal habeas statute extended to Guantanamo may “appl[y] to the
scope of the constitutional habeas right as well. . . .  [I]n Rasul, we said that Guantanamo
was under the complete control and jurisdiction of the United States.”).
32. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2810–22 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2823–49 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); id. at 2849–55 (Alito, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 2810–18 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 2823–29, 2839–49 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Alito joined only part of
Justice Thomas’s dissent on the merits, finding that because the military commissions were
“regularly constituted courts” under Common Article 3, it was unnecessary to address is-
sues concerning the President’s wartime powers. Id. at 2849–55 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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it is almost self-evident that, based on his lower court vote upholding
the commissions, he would have dissented in Hamdan.
Embedded within Justice Thomas’s dissent was a fiercely ex-
pressed admonition that the majority’s ruling would weaken the na-
tion’s ability to fight the “war on terror.”35  That message seems to
have had its effect.  Justice Breyer wrote a separate concurrence,
joined in by Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, offering an as-
surance that the majority’s rulings need not be the last word on this
subject.36  Justice Breyer emphasized that the Court’s ruling essentially
rested on statutes that were inconsistent with the President’s desires
and that “[n]othing prevents the President from returning to Con-
gress to seek the authority he believes necessary.”37
II. THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT
Indeed, President Bush did return to Congress seeking the neces-
sary authority.  On October 17, 2006, President Bush signed the Mili-
tary Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA),38 which, in large measure, can
only be read as a harsh rebuke of the Hamdan Court.  In that statute,
Congress made crystal clear that federal district courts had no habeas
jurisdiction over detainees, whether in pending cases or otherwise.39
35. See id. at 2823 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (commenting that “the Court’s . . . opinion
openly flouts our well-established duty to respect the Executive’s judgment in matters of
military operations and foreign affairs”); id. at 2825 (“I note the Court’s error respecting
the AUMF not because it is necessary to my resolution of this case . . . but to emphasize the
complete congressional sanction of the President’s exercise of his commander-in-chief au-
thority to conduct the present war.”); id. (“Military and foreign policy judgments . . . ‘are
decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility
and which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to
judicial intrusion or inquiry.’” (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 582–83 (2004)
(Thomas, J., dissenting))); id. at 2830 (concluding that the plurality’s reference to the
Federalist Papers “merely highlights the illegitimacy of today’s judicial intrusion onto core
executive prerogatives in the waging of war, where executive competence is at its zenith
and judicial competence at its nadir”); id. at 2838 (commenting that the plurality’s ruling
concerning Hamdan’s conspiracy charge “would sorely hamper the President’s ability to
confront and defeat a new and deadly enemy”).
36. See id. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring).
37. Id.
38. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006); see also JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RE-
SEARCH SERV., THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006: ANALYSIS OF PROCEDURAL RULES
AND COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS DOD RULES AND THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE
6 (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33688.pdf (explaining that
Congress passed the MCA in response to Hamdan).
39. The MCA language reads:
No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an ap-
plication for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by
the United States who has been determined by the United States to have been
properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.
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Indeed, unlike the DTA, where the elimination of habeas was so cava-
lierly approached that it was thought to be “inadvertent,”40 Congress
debated the habeas bar thoroughly when considering the MCA.41  It
fully understood the magnitude of its action, recognizing that this was
only the fifth time in the nation’s history that this age-old foundation
of democratic government was suspended.42
Congress further expressly provided within the MCA that the Ge-
neva Conventions are not “self executing”43 in so far as they cannot
form the basis of any cause of action against the United States, its
officers, or its agents.  The UCMJ was also amended to make clear
that, in important respects, military commissions are to differ from
courts-martial, thereby legislatively undermining the UCMJ’s “uni-
formity requirement” relied upon by the Hamdan Court.
While some of the differences between courts-martial and mili-
tary commissions established by the MCA are either wholly rational,
e.g., eliminating the need for Miranda warnings upon detention of
suspected terror combatants on the field of battle, or helpfully reme-
dial,44 others are problematic.
§ 7(a), 120 Stat. at 2636.
40. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 57–60, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184),
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/05-
184.pdf (Chief Justice Roberts found reference to habeas suspension as possibly being “in-
advertent”).  Linda Greenhouse reported on the following exchange between Justice Sou-
ter and Solicitor General Clement at the Hamdan oral argument:
“Now wait a minute!”  Justice Souter interrupted, waiving a finger.  “The writ is
the writ.  There are not two writs of habeas corpus, for some cases and for other
cases.  The rights that may be asserted, the rights that may be vindicated will vary
with the circumstances, but jurisdiction over habeas corpus is jurisdiction over
habeas corpus.”
Linda Greenhouse, Justices Hint That They’ll Rule On Challenge Filed by Detainee, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 29, 2006, at A1.
41. Arlen Specter, then-chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, emphasized the
importance of habeas corpus, claiming that it should be applied broadly to include the
alleged terrorists being held at Guantanamo Bay. See David G. Savage, Habeas Corpus and
An Era of Limits, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2007, at A9.  However, in a 51-48 vote, the Senate
joined the House and affirmed the President’s view that habeas corpus should not extend
to aliens who are enemy combatants. Id.; see also Editorial, Careless Congress, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 3, 2006, at A28 (noting that although Senator Specter harbored doubts about the
constitutionality of the MCA, he justified his vote for it because the Supreme Court would
“clean it up”).
42. Cf. Carol D. Leonnig & Julie Tate, Sept. 11 Plotter Asks Court for Lawyer Trial; Case
Embodies Debate Over Habeas Rights, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2006, at A3 (noting that the writ of
habeas corpus has been suspended only four times previously in American history, and
opining that the suspension embodied in the MCA would be subject to review in the Su-
preme Court).
43. § 3, 120 Stat. at 2602.
44. There are a wide variety of differences between pre-MCA and post-MCA military
commission procedures.  The MCA provides that a military judge preside over panels of
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For example, Congress broadened the personal jurisdiction of
military commissions to apply to any alien, even those not necessarily
actively engaged in hostilities against the United States, who, inter
alia, “ha[ve] purposefully and materially supported hostilities against
the United States . . . (including a person who is part of . . .
[terrorist-]associated forces).”45  Whereas the President’s original Execu-
tive Order contemplated jurisdiction over aliens actively engaged in
combatant activities on foreign fields of battle,46 the MCA’s focus on
the vague term “material support”—a phrase already the subject of
substantial constitutional litigation in other related contexts47—by
five military officers, or in death penalty cases, twelve military officers. ELSEA, supra note
38, at 13.  Prior to the MCA, there was no requirement that the military commissions be R
supervised by military judges. Id.  Furthermore, the MCA provides for a Court of Military
Commission Review for appeals from the commissions, a body composed exclusively of
military judges who meet the same standards as other military or civilian judges. Id. at 26.
Prior to the MCA, appeals were reviewed by panels who were appointed by the President.
Id. at 14.  Additionally, pre-MCA processes had no bars to improper “command influence”
on military lawyers representing detainees. Id.  The MCA now strictly prohibits command
influence by insulating those military personnel on the commissions or acting as counsel
from adverse impacts in performance evaluations. Id.  Moreover, the MCA greatly limits
the circumstances where a defendant can be tried while not present to those times when
the defendant is disruptive or dangerous. Id. at 17.
45. § 3, 120 Stat. at 2601 (emphasis added).
46. Under this order, persons subject to its requirements are noncitizens and
(1) there is reason to believe that such individual, at the relevant times,
(i) is or was a member of the organization known as al Qaida;
(ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of inter-
national terrorism, or acts in preparation therefor, that have caused,
threaten to cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse
effects on the United States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy,
or economy; . . . and
(2) it is in the interest of the United States that such individual be subject to this
order.
Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism § 2(a), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834 (Nov. 16, 2001).
47. E.g., United States v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150, 1160 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that
contributing money to a group branded by the State Department as a “foreign terrorist
organization” constitutes “materially supporting the organization” and, as such, is consid-
ered “materially supporting actual violence”), reh’g en banc denied, 446 F.3d 915, 920 n.6
(9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that
the monetary donations were made during a period where the designated foreign terrorist
organization should not have been so designated), cert. denied sub nom. Rahmani v. United
States, 127 S. Ct. 930 (2007); United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 360–61 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (finding unconstitutionally vague certain provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2000),
which prohibits the knowing provisions of material support or resources, including in the
form of “communications equipment” and “personnel,” to a foreign terrorist organiza-
tion). But see United States v. Goba, 220 F. Supp. 2d 182, 194 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding the
criminalization in 18 U.S.C. § 2339B of the act of providing material support to a foreign
terrorist organization not to be unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendants charged
with training at a foreign terrorist organization camp).
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someone merely “associated” with terrorists opens a Pandora’s box of
confusing ambiguity.  Some have thought that this loose definition
opens the door to military commissions focused on purely domestic
activities within the United States, including those of resident aliens
otherwise fully protected by the Constitution who have nothing to do
with armed conflict.48  It has been generally understood that an essen-
tial predicate to the use of military commissions is a focus on viola-
tions of the laws of war in military battles.49
Moreover, the MCA, while prohibiting evidence adduced by tor-
ture, nevertheless affords military judges considerable latitude to use
detainee statements coerced by interrogators.  Coerced statements
elicited prior to the DTA’s prohibition of “cruel, inhumane, or de-
grading”50 interrogations are admissible only if the military judge
should conclude that “the totality of the circumstances renders the
[coerced] statement reliable and possessing sufficient probative
value” and “the interests of justice would best be served by [admissibil-
ity].”51  Statements coerced after passage of the DTA’s McCain
Amendment are admissible if the two standards articulated above are
met and “the interrogation methods . . . do not amount to cruel, inhu-
man, or degrading treatment” prohibited, inter alia, by the Eighth
Amendment.52  Thus, by legislative legerdemain, the protections
within the much-lauded McCain Amendment are redefined merely to
prevent conduct violating the quite limited reach of the Eighth
Amendment.53
Finally, Congress did not undertake what it deemed to be a
tempting, but legally questionable and politically unpopular, decision
to make the Geneva Conventions wholly inapplicable to the Guanta-
namo detainees.  However, it did make the Conventions much harder
to enforce.  Not only did it remove habeas jurisdiction as an avenue
48. Cf. Human Rights First, Human Rights First Opposes Military Commissions Legisla-
tion, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/US_law/etn/index.asp (last visited Mar. 9, 2007)
(arguing that the definition of “unlawful enemy combatants” is overly broad, as it might
include resident aliens).
49. WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 773, 836 (2d ed. 1920); see also
ELSEA, supra note 38, at 8 (explaining that military commissions have jurisdiction over any R
offense that is covered by the MCA or that is a violation of the law of war).
50. Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, § 1003, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005) (to be codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000dd).
51. MCA § 3, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2607 (2006).
52. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, § 1003, 119 Stat. 2739, 2739–40 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000dd to 2000dd-1)).
53. Cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977) (finding that “[a]fter incarcera-
tion, only the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment” (citations omitted) (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976))).
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for seeking relief under the Conventions,54 it also expressly eliminated
using those treaties as a basis for any other cause of action against the
United States.55  More importantly, it watered down Common Article
3’s prohibition against “humiliating and degrading treatment” of de-
tainees by defining (or, more accurately, redefining) that term to bar
only those activities causing bodily injury that involve “(I) a substantial
risk of death; (II) extreme physical pain; (III) a burn or physical dis-
figurement of a serious nature . . . ; or (IV) significant loss or impair-
ment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.”56
This definition not only departs from international norms,57 thereby
permitting interrogation practices generally thought to be barred by
Common Article 3, but it has the additional troubling effect of at-
tempting to make prosecution of a wide range of abusive practices by
U.S. interrogators nearly impossible under the federal War Crimes
Act.58
III. THE HARSH REALITY OF GUANTANAMO
The question that remains, however, is how a conservative Su-
preme Court ended up being the beˆte noir of an equally conservative
Congress.  In this vein, it must be remembered that since Lyndon
Johnson nominated, and a Democratic-controlled Senate confirmed,
54. MCA § 5, 120 Stat. at 2631.
55. Id.
56. Id. § 3, 130 Stat. at 2627–28.  The MCA definition reverts back to an August 2002
Office of Legal Counsel memorandum, later retracted by the Justice Department, which
defined torture as inflicting permanent injury “such as organ failure, impairment of bodily
function, or even death.”  Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://
www.washingtonpost .com/wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.
pdf.  For a comprehensive description of the initial disclosure of the “Torture Opinion”
and the Justice Department’s policy revisions, see Dana Priest & R. Jeffrey Smith, Memo
Offered Justification for Use of Torture, Justice Dept. Gave Advice in 2002, WASH. POST, June 8,
2004, at A1; R. Jeffrey Smith & Dan Eggen, Justice Expands “Torture” Definition; Earlier Policy
Drew Criticism, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2004, at A1.
57. E.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85,
113–14 (defining torture as “severe pain or suffering” without requiring any type of perma-
nent physical or mental injury).
58. The MCA definition was incorporated into the federal War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2441 (2000). See MCA § 6, 120 Stat. at 2634.  Furthermore, the MCA retroactively applies
this definition to limit the liability of American military personnel, id. § 6, 120 Stat. at 2635,
denies the right of any person subject to the military commission to invoke the Geneva
Conventions in any action against the United States or its agents, id. § 5, 120 Stat. at 2631,
denies the ability to invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of law in general, id. § 3,
120 Stat. at 2602, and, subject to exceptions within the Act, strips the courts of any jurisdic-
tion over habeas corpus claims, id. § 7, 120 Stat. at 2635–36.
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Justice Thurgood Marshall almost forty years ago, there have been fif-
teen judicial confirmations to the Court.59  Only two of those Justices
were appointed by a Democratic President.60  The remaining thirteen
have been nominated by conservative Republican Presidents and, with
every nomination, that President assured both the public and the Sen-
ate that his nominee would uphold conservative, “strict construction-
ist,” and non-activist principles.  Yet, even after those forty years, the
Court has continued a centrist or moderate drift, befuddling the con-
servative Presidents, Senators, and activists engaged in the confirma-
tion process.61  Indeed, the Hamdan majority itself was composed of
three Justices appointed by Republican Presidents.
For a better understanding of the motivations of the Hamdan ma-
jority, it is useful to examine the broader factual undergirdings of the
Guantanamo facility itself and the detainees held there.  On January
3, 2002, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld announced that al Qaeda and
Taliban combatants captured on the field of battle in the Afghanistan
conflict would be detained by the Department of Defense (DOD) at
the United States naval facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.62  The Sec-
retary announced several days later that these detainees, having alleg-
edly fought without uniforms or insignia and having chosen innocent
civilians as their principal targets, would be deemed unlawful enemy
combatants not entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conven-
tion.63  Since its opening as a detention facility, Guantanamo has
housed over 770 alleged unlawful combatants, but only ten have been
charged with crimes.64  A majority of the detainees were not captured
by the U.S. military, but were instead turned over by Afghanistan and
Pakistan militia and civilians to the United States in return for sub-
stantial bounties paid by the United States for capturing al Qaeda or
59. Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, http://www.supremecourtus.
gov/about/members.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
60. See id.
61. See, e.g., Fred Barnes, Souter-phobia, WKLY. STANDARD, Aug. 1, 2005, at 11; Fred
Hutchison, The Enigma of the Moderate Republican Judges: The Mystery of the Leftward Migration,
RENEW AMERICA, July 16, 2005, http://www.renewamerica.us/analyses/050717hutchi-
son.htm; Dana Milbank, And the Verdict on Justice Kennedy Is: Guilty, WASH. POST, Apr. 9,
2005, at A3.
62. Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec’y of Def., Department of Defense News Briefing with
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers (Jan. 3, 2002), http://www.defenselink.mil/tran-
scripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1046.
63. Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec’y of Def., Department of Defense News Briefing with
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers (Jan. 11, 2002), http://www.defenselink.mil/tran-
scripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2031.
64. See Judd Legum et al., National Security: Five Years Too Long, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
ACTION FUND, Jan. 12, 2007, http://www.americanprogressaction.org/progressreport/
2007/01/pr_2007_01_12.html.
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Taliban forces.65  There has been speculation that the financial incen-
tives for capture overwhelmed the true non-combatant nature of those
detained.66
Until the June 28, 2004 Supreme Court decisions in Rasul v.
Bush67 and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,68 no systematic effort was made by the
DOD to determine whether the detainees were combatants or, if com-
batants, whether they were entitled to the substantial protections the
Geneva Conventions affords to prisoners of war.  Thus, the Afghani-
stan incursion became the first conflict since the advent of the Geneva
Conventions in 1949 where the United States military did not convene
battlefield tribunals to determine whether those captured were prop-
erly classified as combatants or prisoners of war or were innocent civil-
ians69 caught up in military turmoil.  After Rasul established that
Guantanamo detainees could bring habeas actions challenging their
detention70 and after Hamdi strongly implied that they had due pro-
cess rights pertaining to the question of the propriety of their deten-
tion,71 the DOD quickly instituted Combatant Status Review Tribunals
(CSRTs) to review the unlawful enemy combatant determination
made pertaining to the detainees.72  Criticism pertaining to the proce-
dural shortcomings of the CSRTs has been legion.  Detainees before
CSRTs have not been represented by counsel.73  Often confronted
with nothing more than bare allegations that there was classified but
65. See MARK DENBEAUX & JOSHUA DENBEAUX, REPORT ON GUANTANAMO DETAINEES 2–3,
14–15 (2006), http://law.shu.edu/news/guantanamo_report_final_2_08_06.pdf [herein-
after DENBEAUX & DENBEAUX, GUANTANAMO DETAINEE REPORT].
66. See id. at 15 (noting that bounty hunters were driven by cash incentives to assert
that certain individuals now held at Guantanamo were enemy combatants).
67. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
68. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
69. See Robert M. Chesney, Panel Report: Beyond Article III Courts: Military Tribunals, Status
Review Tribunals, and Immigration Courts, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 27, 37 (2006)
(discussing the remarks of Gitanjali Gutierrez, counsel for several Guantanamo detainees,
who suggested that there are large numbers of innocent people currently held at Guanta-
namo Bay); Peter Irons, “The Constitution Is Just a Scrap of Paper”: Empire Versus Democracy, 73
U. CIN. L. REV. 1081, 1086–87 (2005) (asserting that many “bystanders or innocent villag-
ers” had been picked up by the U.S. military in Afghanistan); Tom Malinowski, Editorial,
Who’s Really Locked Up in Guantanamo?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2006, at B11 (reporting that
“[f]ewer than half [of the detainees] were caught on battlefields in Afghanistan or by U.S.
troops”); David Rohde, Afghans Freed from Guantanamo Speak of Heat and Isolation, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 29, 2002, at A18 (describing accusations that American officials relied on
“faulty information” when detaining people).
70. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484.
71. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533 (plurality opinion).
72. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 450 (D.D.C. 2005), vacated
sub nom. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007).
73. See id. at 450 (observing that detainees do not have a right to counsel in CSRT
proceedings).
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undisclosed evidence that they were unlawful combatants, detainees
without the right to access evidence of their own bore the burden of
proving their non-combatant status.74  A recent report by Amnesty In-
ternational on the CSRTs75 has led the British director of Amnesty to
brand these proceedings “shabby show trials.”76  Very few detainees
were found to be noncombatants under these one-sided proceed-
ings.77  Moreover, those who were deemed noncombatants often re-
mained at Guantanamo because the DOD was unable to repatriate
them.78
Besides the inadequacy of process pertaining to their status, the
abuses of the detention and the interrogation practices employed at
Guantanamo have became legendary.  Detainees have been held in-
communicado without access to the outside world.79  Before Rasul and
Hamdi, detainees were denied any form of legal assistance.  Even after
those decisions, counsel for detainees have lodged protests over the
lack of adequate access to their clients and violations of the attorney-
client privilege.80
Interrogation practices have almost certainly included water-
boarding,81 extreme temperature changes,82 profaning Islamic relig-
74. See, e.g., id. at 450, 468–70 (discussing the hearing of one detainee who could only
continually assert that he had no association with an al Qaeda operative because the CSRT
refused to give him the name of that operative).
75. AMNESTY INT’L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: JUSTICE DELAYED AND JUSTICE DENIED?
TRIALS UNDER THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT (2007), http://amnesty.org.uk/uploads/
documents/doc_17641.pdf.
76. Protest over ‘Shabby Show Trials,’ BBC NEWS, Mar. 22, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/uk/6477957.stm; see also MARK DENBEAUX & JOSHUA DENBEAUX, NO-HEARING HEAR-
INGS, CSRT: THE MODERN HABEAS CORPUS? (2006), http://law.shu.edu/news/final_no_
hearing_hearings_report.pdf [hereinafter DENBEAUX & DENBEAUX, NO-HEARING
HEARINGS].
77. See DENBEAUX & DENBEAUX, NO-HEARING HEARINGS, supra note 76, at 39 (explaining R
that 7% of detainees who received a hearing through the CSRT process were found to be
noncombatants or no longer enemy combatants and released).
78. See Press Release, President George W. Bush, President Discusses Creation of Mili-
tary Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html [hereinafter Military Commissions Speech]
(“[O]ne of the reasons we have not been able to close Guantanamo is that many countries
have refused to take back their nationals held at the facility.”).
79. See ACLU, ENDURING ABUSE: TORTURE AND CRUEL TREATMENT BY THE UNITED STATES
AT HOME AND ABROAD 27 (2006), http://www.aclu.org/safefree/torture/torture_report.
pdf.
80. See, e.g., Ben Fox, Defense Seeks to Move Gitmo Trials to U.S., ASSOC. PRESS, June 15,
2006, available at http://www.cbsnews.stories/2006/06/15/ap/world/mainD818DE580.
html; Ben Fox, Guantanamo Lawyers Say Letters Seized, ASSOC. PRESS, June 30, 2006, available
at http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=2140656&page=1.
81. ENDURING ABUSE, supra note 79, at 4. R
82. Dan Eggen & R. Jeffrey Smith, FBI Agents Allege Abuse of Detainees at Guantanamo Bay,
WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2004, at A1.
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ious materials and practices,83 sleep and food deprivation,84 physical
stress positions,85 and rough physical handling (e.g., punching and
slapping).86  It was soon reported that the interrogation practices
were so abusive that at one stage the FBI refused to participate further
in them.87  Investigative reports have suggested that the interrogation
and prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib have their genesis in practices de-
veloped by the military at Guantanamo.88
Reports of the abuses at Guantanamo have received widespread
and worldwide condemnation.  The British Parliament,89 the Euro-
pean Union,90 two Secretarys General of the United Nations,91 inter-
national jurists,92 international and domestic bar associations,93 and
83. See Press Release, ACLU, Guanta´namo Prisoners Told FBI of Qur’an Desecration in
2002, New Documents Reveal (May 25, 2005), available at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/
general/17630prs20050525.html.
84. See Dan Eggen, FBI Reports Duct-Taping, “Baptizing” at Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Jan.
3, 2007, at A1.
85. See Eggen & Smith, supra note 82 (describing how detainees were chained to the R
floor in the fetal position).
86. See ACLU, supra note 83. R
87. See Julia Preston, A.C.L.U. Gains in Its Quest for C.I.A. Documents on Detainees, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2005, at A13; ACLU, FBI Inquiry Details Abuses Reported by Agents at Guanta´-
namo (Jan. 3, 2007), http://www.aclu.org/safefree/torture/27816prs20070103.html (de-
tailing accounts of detainees being beaten).
88. See, e.g., Nick Timiraos, Army Officer OKd Dogs in Interrogations, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16,
2006, at A12 (reporting that Col. Pappas, who oversaw interrogations at Abu Ghraib, stated
that “the military requested dog handlers at the [Abu Ghraib] prison at the recommenda-
tion of Maj. Gen. Geoffrey D. Miller, an Army detention officer who oversaw the U.S.
prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba”); Josh White, Abu Ghraib Tactics Were First Used at Guanta-
namo, WASH. POST, July 14, 2005, at A1 (comparing the abusive practices depicted in the
photographs of Abu Ghraib with the tactics used to interrogate Mohamed Qahtani, the
believed “20th hijacker” in the 9/11 terrorist attacks, at Guantanamo Bay in 2002).
89. See FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, VISIT TO GUANTA´NAMO BAY, 2006–7, H.C. 44-2, at
37 (recommending that Guantanamo be closed “as soon as may be consistent with the
overriding need to protect the public from terrorist threats”), available at http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmfaff/44/44.pdf.
90. See Euro MPs Urge Guantanamo Closure, BBC NEWS, June 13, 2006, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5074216.stm; see also Letter from Human Rights Watch to
EU Foreign Ministers (July 14, 2006), available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/07/
14/usdom13738.htm.
91. See U.N. Chief: “Ban” Gitmo, N.Y. POST, Jan. 12, 2007, at 30 (discussing U.N. Secre-
tary-General Ban Ki-moon’s remarks that both he and former Secretary-General Kofi An-
nan believe that the Guantanamo facility should be closed).
92. See Tony Karon, Why Guantanamo Has Europe Hopping Mad, TIME.com, Jan. 24, 2002,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,197210,00.html (stating that many lead-
ing international jurists support the view that prisoners at Guantanamo should be afforded
rights commensurate with POWs or common criminals and that the category “unlawful
combatant” does not exist in international law).
93. See Press Release, Int’l Bar Ass’n, Guantanamo Bay Detainees are Entitled to Chal-
lenge their Detention in Court, IBA Human Rights Institute Briefs US Supreme Court
(Jan. 25, 2004) (criticizing the U.S. government for attempting to hold prisoners outside of
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human rights groups94 have all condemned the handling of detainees
at Guantanamo in the strongest of terms and, in most instances, have
called for its closure.  The International Red Cross, the body assigned
to monitor the enforcement of the Geneva Conventions, has gone so
far as to take the unprecedented step of publicly condemning the
United States for the conditions at Guantanamo after repeated visits
to that facility failed to lead to remediation of conditions.95
The facility has widely been recognized by some in the media and
in international polling as one of the foremost reasons for the United
States’ substantial loss of standing in the world community.96  Addi-
tionally, key Bush Administration officials, including Secretary of De-
fense Robert Gates and Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, have
expressed their desire to see Guantanamo Bay “shut down as quickly
as possible.”97  Even President Bush has recently acknowledged an in-
terest in closing the facility.98
their sovereign territory and normal legal frameworks by placing detainees at Guanta-
namo), available at http://archive.ibanet.org/news/NewsItem.asp?newsID=132; Katerina
Ossenova, UK Attorney General Repeats Call for Guantanamo Bay Closure on US Visit, JURIST,
Sept. 17, 2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/09/uk-attorney-general-re-
peats-call-for.php; Neal R. Sonnett, Guantanamo: Still a Legal Black Hole, 33 HUM. RTS.: J.
INDIVIDUAL RTS. & RESP. 8 (2006) (discussing the absence of basic due process procedures
at Guantanamo detainee hearings).
94. Michael Posner, Editorial, Close Camp Delta, BALT. SUN, June 5, 2005, at C5; US:
Mark Five Years of Guantanamo by Closing it, HUM. RTS. WATCH, Jan. 5, 2007, http://hrw.org/
english/docs/2007/01/05/usdom14974.htm (denouncing ongoing detentions at Guanta-
namo as a shameful denial of human rights by America).
95. See Press Release, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, ICRC President Urges Progress on
Detention-Related Issues (Jan. 16, 2004) (stating that two years after capture, Guantanamo
detainees were still facing indefinite detention without any recourse in law), available at
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5v9te8?opendocument; see also Gabor
Rona, “War” Doesn’t Justify Guantanamo, FIN. TIMES (UK), Mar. 1, 2004, at 17 (observing that
the U.S. worldview of the war on terror permits American forces to detain suspected ter-
rorists under international law, but also allows them to deny these detainees a legal hear-
ing); Brett Murphy, Detainee Abuse in CIA Secret Prisons Documented in ICRC Report, JURIST,
Mar. 21, 2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2007/03/detainee-abuse-in-cia-se-
cret-prisons.php (reporting that detainees held around the globe by the CIA were subject
to sleep deprivation and abuse).
96. See, e.g., World View of US Role Goes From Bad to Worse, BBC NEWS, Jan. 23, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/23_01_07_us_poll.pdf (noting that 67% of
people in twenty-two different countries disapprove of American treatment of prisoners at
Guantanamo); Editorial, The President’s Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2007.
97. Thom Shanker & David E. Sanger, New to Pentagon, Gates Argued For Closing Guanta-
namo Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2007, at A1.  State Department and Pentagon officials
have admitted that close allies are uncomfortable with the policies at Guantanamo, making
it harder “to coordinate efforts in counterterrorism, intelligence and law enforcement.”
Id.
98. See Military Commissions Speech, supra note 78 (“[W]e will continue to urge na- R
tions across the world to take back their nationals at Guantanamo who will not be prose-
cuted by our military commissions.  America has no interest in being the world’s jailer.”).
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In then-Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s defense of Guantanamo,
he assured the American public and the world community that the
detainees there represented the “worst of the worst” terrorists.99  How-
ever, the facts have long since belied that claim.  Even with the ab-
sence of adequate process, the DOD has voluntarily released thirty-
eight detainees, most of whom have been set free by their home coun-
tries upon their return.100  The British lobbied for years for the re-
lease of nine of its citizens held at Guantanamo, and when those
detainees were finally returned to England, they were freed virtually as
soon as they walked off of their returning planes.101  Additionally,
three of the detainees held at Guantanamo were under sixteen years
old when detained and were held in a holding facility especially
equipped for adolescents.102  It has now been reported that many of
the detainees had never even engaged in combat on a battlefield
against the United States.103
Further evidence of the lack of serious culpability on the part of
the majority of the detainees is that at the time the Hamdan decision
was rendered—nearly four and one half years after the Guantanamo
facility opened—only ten detainees had been charged with war crimes
and made subject to the pre-MCA military commissions.104  Proceed-
ings had commenced against only four of those ten, including
Hamdan himself.105  Moreover, by the time the MCA was enacted on
October 17, 2006, not a single proceeding against a detainee had en-
tered the trial phase.106
99. Ari Fleischer, White House Press Sec’y, Press Briefing (Jan. 16, 2002), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020116-7.html.
100. DENBEAUX & DENBEAUX, NO-HEARING HEARINGS, supra note 76, at 39. R
101. See Dafna Linzer & Glenn Kessler, Decision to Move Detainees Resolved Two-Year Debate
Among Bush Advisors, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2006 (noting the Administration’s decision to
release the final four British detainees who “were sent home to Britain and immediately
freed”).
102. See U.S. Frees 3 Teens at Guantanamo Base, CNN.com, Jan. 29, 2004, http://
www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/americas/01/29/gitmo.teens/index.html.
103. See DENBEAUX & DENBEAUX, GUANTANAMO DETAINEE REPORT, supra note 65, at 4; R
Irons, supra note 69, at 1086; Malinowski, supra note 69, at B11; see also Boumediene v. R
Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478, 1480 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(“[M]any [Guantanamo detainees] were seized outside any theater of hostility, in places
like Pakistan, Thailand, and Zambia.”).
104. See ELSEA, supra note 38, at 3. R
105. Kathleen T. Rhem, Judge Orders Military Trial at Guantanamo Bay Halted, U.S. FED.
NEWS, Nov. 15, 2005.
106. Neil A. Lewis, Officials See Qaeda Trials Using New Law in 2007, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3,
2006, at A18.  Despite the enactment of the MCA, detainees may still be able to challenge
their detentions as violative of their constitutional habeas rights.
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Indeed, after Hamdan had been decided and the President began
his campaign to pass legislation that was to become the MCA, he re-
moved fourteen top al Qaeda operatives from secret CIA-run prisons
in Europe to hold them at Guantanamo for war crimes prosecu-
tion.107  That move was viewed as necessary to justify the MCA, be-
cause, in the absence of these alleged front line al Qaeda operatives
being held in Cuba, it was hard to make a case for the dire need for
military commissions in light of the absence of serious culpability of
most of the remaining Guantanamo detainees.108
The reputation of the President’s pre-MCA Guantanamo military
commissions has fared no better than that of the detention facility
itself.  Those Commissions were established by a bare-bones Executive
Order of November 13, 2001.109  The DOD’s attempts to flesh out the
details of the commissions’ operation were met with repeated world-
wide condemnation, including two separate stinging critiques by the
American Bar Association House of Delegates.110  The DOD was re-
peatedly forced to revise the military commission structure as evi-
denced by the publication of two separate military orders and ten
military commission instructions outlining practices and procedures
before the commission.111  The process was so confusing and obtuse
that those charged with launching formal proceedings were forced to
shut them down because of uncertainty of how to proceed.112  As he
attempted to launch tribunal proceedings, one military commission
judge was discovered to have a request pending before the Attorney
General to become an immigration judge.113  JAG officers assigned to
defend the detainees complained of harassment and career threats if
107. See Jonathan Karl, “High Value” Detainees Transferred to Guantanamo, ABC NEWS,
Sept. 6, 2006, http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=2400470.
108. Cf. Linzer & Kessler, supra note 101 (discussing the international reaction to the R
public disclosure of the secret CIA prisons and the push to end the prolonged detention
without trial of those at Guantanamo).
109. Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism § 4, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834–35 (Nov. 16,
2001).
110. For both resolutions, as well as a letter addressed to the DOD regarding the MCA,
see http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/antiterror/061020letter_milcom_dod.pdf.
111. See ELSEA, supra note 38, at 2–3 & n.11. R
112. Joshua Pantesco, Guantanamo Military Judge Unsure of What Laws Govern Detainee
Trial, JURIST, Apr. 4, 2006, http://www.jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/04/guanta-
namo_military_judge_unsure_of.php (describing how one military judge, uncertain if mili-
tary or federal criminal laws and procedures governed the proceeding, responded to the
request of a detainee’s counsel for specific instructions with “I’m not going to speculate as
to what is or what is not controlling”).
113. Sara Wood, Case of Accused Teen Terrorist Hits More Legal Road Blocks, U.S. FED. NEWS,
Apr. 6, 2006.
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they pursued too active a defense.114  Indeed, within two weeks of his
victory before the Supreme Court, Hamdan’s lead military counsel,
Lieutenant Commander Charles Swift, was denied promotion, thereby
necessitating his leave of military service.115  JAG officers have also
complained about abundant ethical conflicts presented by the ineffec-
tive organization of their offices, requiring them, inter alia, to re-
present groups of detainees who should be represented separately.116
While some of these damning facts made their way to the Su-
preme Court either as part of the Hamdan record or in briefs amicus
curiae in that case, the full scope of the worldwide controversy over
the Guantanamo facility and the ineptitude of the military commis-
sion effort was so prevalent within the everyday media in general and
the proceedings of the worldwide associations of jurists and lawyers in
particular that it could not possibly have escaped the attention of the
Justices.  These facts clearly had little impact on the three Hamdan
dissenters or on Chief Justice Roberts when he participated in the
D.C. Circuit’s consideration of the Hamdan case.  However, one can-
not help but speculate that these facts had a substantial impact on the
thinking of the five Justices in the majority, especially on the crucial
“swing” vote of Justice Kennedy.
IV. JUSTICE KENNEDY AND THE WORLD
While not a certainty by any means prior to the decision, the
votes of four more liberal members of the Court (Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) in Hamdan could not be classified as a
great surprise.  To the casual Court observer and to the larger public,
however, Justice Kennedy’s affirmation of the sweep of Hamdan, espe-
cially that part of the decision making the Geneva Conventions appli-
114. Cf. Jonathan Mahler, Commander Swift Objects, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2004, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 42, 45 (discussing the conflicting tensions between the role of Navy JAGs as coun-
sel for detainees and the DOD as the JAGs’ employer).
115. See Carol Rosenberg, Guanta´namo Defense Attorney Forced Out of Navy, SEATTLE TIMES,
Oct. 8, 2006.
116. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Establishing a Constitutional Process: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Charles D. Swift, Lieutenant Com-
mander, Judge Advocate General Corps, U.S. Navy), available at http://judici-
ary.senate.gov/print_testimony.cfm?id=1986&wit_id=5510.  Lieutenant Commander Swift
testified:
The system for assigning several defense counsel from the same office to re-
present alleged co-conspirators violated some defense counsel’s state bar ethical
rules.  The Pennsylvania Bar Association advised the military defense counsel in
one military commission case that she had “a disqualifying conflict of interest”
due to the office’s representation of multiple alleged co-conspirators.
Id.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-3\MLR308.txt unknown Seq: 20 10-MAY-07 10:41
824 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 66:805
cable to the detainees, was highly noteworthy.117  Yet, a careful
examination of Justice Kennedy’s legal background, scholarly inter-
ests, extra-judicial relationships, and his recent high profile rulings
make his vote more understandable.  Indeed, these very factors are
strong predictors of where the Court will go when detainee cases re-
turn to the Justices, as a result of the plethora of issues raised by Con-
gress’s throwing down the gauntlet by passing the MCA.
The most helpful key to understanding Justice Kennedy’s influ-
ences in this regard is Jeffrey Toobin’s biographical sketch of the ju-
rist in the New Yorker, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy’s Passion for
Foreign Law Could Change the Supreme Court, which was written almost a
year before Hamdan was decided.118  In what can now be viewed as
prescient observations, Toobin explains that a myopic focus on the
Justice’s “provincial background”119 as a Harvard-trained lawyer/lob-
byist in Sacramento, California may be quite deceiving.  As a teenager,
Justice Kennedy worked on oil rigs in Canada and Louisiana.  After
college, he studied at the London School of Economics.  While prac-
ticing in Sacramento, he was admitted to the bar in Mexico.  As a
Ninth Circuit Judge, he was appointed by Chief Justice Burger as a
supervisor of U.S. territorial courts in the South Pacific, to which he
traveled frequently.
For the last sixteen years, Justice Kennedy has spent his summers
in Salzburg, Austria, where he teaches classes in a program that the
McGeorge School of Law hosts at the University of Salzburg.  At that
program, he teaches a course entitled Fundamental Rights in Europe and
the United States.  During his Salzburg stays, he has also actively partici-
pated, both officially and unofficially, in what Toobin correctly calls
“the most important international judges’ conference”120 in the
117. To be sure, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence limited the sweep of that portion of
Justice Stevens’s opinion, which only garnered four votes. See Quint, supra note 4, at 782 R
(commenting that only a plurality found that the crime of conspiracy to violate the laws of
war was not itself a violation of the “laws of war,” and that several procedures of military
commissions violated Common Article 3); Young, supra note 4, at 798 (noting that Justice R
Kennedy found it unnecessary to reach the constitutionality of certain features of the mili-
tary commissions system).  However, as mentioned at length in the accompanying essays
and above, what remains of Hamdan after Kennedy’s concurrence is of the most substantial
import.
118. Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy’s Passion for Foreign Law Could
Change the Supreme Court, NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42.  The biographical information
laid out immediately below is derived from the Toobin article.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 47.
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world, the Salzburg Seminar, where the Justice is described as always
“eager to meet his foreign counterparts.”121
The Justice also serves on “the board of an [ABA] group that ad-
vises judges and lawyers in China, where he travels about once a
year.”122  After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Justice Kennedy “began to
advise emerging democracies—including Czechoslovakia and Rus-
sia—on their constitutions and rule of law.”123
Based on these broad and diverse experiences, Toobin concludes
that, while the Justice on many issues remains a reliable conservative
vote (having, for example, been recognized as the principal author of
the unsigned majority opinion in Bush v. Gore),124 he
has a passion for foreign cultures and ideas . . . . [H]e has
become a leading proponent of one of the most cosmopoli-
tan, and controversial, trends in constitutional law: using for-
eign and international law as an aid to interpreting the
United States Constitution.  Kennedy’s embrace of foreign
law may be among the most significant developments on the
Court in recent years . . . .125
Justice Kennedy’s most prominent uses of foreign law as a guide
to U.S. constitutional interpretation are his majority opinions in Law-
rence v. Texas126 and Roper v. Simmons.127  On a 6-3 vote, Lawrence over-
ruled the seventeen-year-old precedent of Bowers v. Hardwick,128 by
holding that states cannot criminalize sodomy between consenting
adults.129  Among the legal authorities and institutions Justice Ken-
nedy relied upon were an act passed by British Parliament, a decision
by the European Court of Human Rights, the European Convention
on Human Rights, and the Council of Europe.130
121. Id. at 48.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 47.
124. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).  Edward Lazarus recently observed that Justice
Kennedy, “as the unacknowledged author,” has aggressively defended the opinion.  Ed-
ward Lazarus, Supreme Court Justices’ Increased Propensity to Speak Publicly: It May Be Positive at
Times, but when the Justices Speak Out on Bush v. Gore, They Only Do Further Damage, FINDLAW,
Mar. 6, 2007, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/20070306.html.
125. Toobin, supra note 118, at 42. R
126. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
127. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
128. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
129. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.  Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion drew the votes of five
Justices, and although Justice O’Connor agreed with the result, she concurred separately
on equal protection grounds. Id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 572–73.
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On a 5-4 vote in Roper, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court,
declared the death penalty unconstitutional for juveniles under the
age of eighteen.131  In that opinion for the Court, he relied on the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the recog-
nition that only seven countries besides the United States had exe-
cuted juveniles since 1990.132  He added:
It is proper we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of
international opinion against the juvenile death penalty . . . .
. . . It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or
our pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express affir-
mation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and
peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same
rights within our own heritage of freedom.133
Needless to say, Justice Kennedy’s views have not been well re-
ceived by all members of the Court.  Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas dissented in both Lawrence134 and Roper,135
condemning reliance on foreign sources of law to interpret the Con-
stitution.  Justice Alito expressed doubts about the foreign law ap-
proach in his confirmation hearings.136  Justice Scalia’s observation in
his Roper dissent best exemplifies the criticism by these Justices:
[T]he basic premise of the Court’s argument—that Ameri-
can law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world—
ought to be rejected out of hand . . . .
. . . .
. . . What these foreign sources “affirm,” . . . is the Jus-
tices’ own notion of how the world ought to be, and their
diktat that it shall be so henceforth in America.137
The reaction from conservative members of Congress to Justice
Kennedy’s use of foreign legal authorities in Lawrence and Roper was
predictably “swift and strong”138 with legislative opponents “seem[ing]
131. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
132. Id. at 576–77.
133. Id. at 578.
134. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135. Roper, 543 U.S. at 622–28 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
136. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr., to be an Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
370 (2006) (statement of Samuel A. Alito, Jr.) (“We have our own law, we have our own
traditions, we have our own precedents, and we should look to that in interpreting our
Constitution.”).
137. Roper, 543 U.S. at 624, 628 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138. Harlan Grant Cohen, Supremacy and Diplomacy: The International Law of the U.S. Su-
preme Court, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 273, 273 (2006).
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to shudder with anger.”139  For example, Congressman Tom Feeney
(R-FL) insisted on the “removal of international influence in the
United States court system. . . .  The Supreme Court has insulted the
Constitution by overturning its own precedent to appease contempo-
rary foreign laws, social trends, and attitudes.”140
Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) complained that the Court’s trans-
nationalist tendencies meant that “the American people may be losing
their ability to determine what their criminal laws shall be—losing to
the control of foreign courts and foreign governments.”141  One
scholar has observed that “Justice Kennedy raised such ire with his
decision in Roper that some were even calling for his impeachment.”142
This sentiment has also spurred legislative proposals to bar federal
courts from using foreign law for purposes of constitutional
interpretation.143
Given Justice Kennedy’s proclivity to find foreign law and
respected international scholarly thinking persuasive, his vote in
Hamdan can therefore hardly be viewed as unexpected.  That is espe-
cially the case in light of the disrepute Guantanamo has brought to
the United States and that facility’s role in the undercutting of this
country’s long-standing reputation as the foremost worldwide expo-
nent of the rule of law.  The nation’s standing has been widely viewed
as tarnished by the now well-recognized fact that a large number of
Guantanamo detainees were and are civilian non-combatants swept up
and held for years by the United States military for reasons having
little to do with military necessity or national security.  To be sure, as
the accompanying essays make clear, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence
limited the scope of Justice Stevens’s reading of Common Article 3.
Indeed, even Justice Stevens pulled back from the brink by finding the
Geneva Conventions applicable to the detainees because the treaties
had been incorporated into governing U.S. law, i.e., the UCMJ, not
139. Id.
140. Press Release, Representative Tom Feeney, Supreme Court Ruling Reiterates Im-
portance of the Reaffirmation of American Independence Resolution (Mar. 2, 2005), available at
http://www.house.gov/hensarling/rsc/doc/Feeney—intlinfluence.pdf (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
141. 151 CONG. REC. S3109, 3111 (2005) (statement of Sen. Cornyn) (introducing Sen-
ate Resolution 109-92, which condemns the use of foreign law as a means to interpret the
Constitution).
142. Donald J. Kochan, Sovereignty and the American Courts at the Cocktail Party of Interna-
tional Law: The Dangers of Domestic Judicial Invocations of Foreign and International Law, 29
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 507, 520 (2006).
143. E.g., American Justice for American Citizens Act, H.R. 1658, 109th Cong. 1, 1
(2005) (“To ensure that the courts interpret the Constitution in the manner that the Fram-
ers intended.”).
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because the treaties were self-executing.  However, even with these ca-
veats, the Hamdan holdings are stunningly broad as outlined here and
in the accompanying essays at great length.
V. CONGRESS AND THE 2006 MID-TERM ELECTIONS
It might well be asked why, if Guantanamo was so clearly the
problem articulated above, Congress undercut Hamdan’s sweep
through passage of the MCA.  The MCA, however, must be viewed in
its political context. Hamdan was decided as the House and the Sen-
ate entered a summer lull at the end of the 109th Congress.  When
the pace of legislative business began to pick up after Labor Day, the
President and the Republican Congress saw the chance to use Hamdan
as a sword against the Democratic Party entering into the November
mid-term elections.144
By September 2006, polls were showing the substantial possibility
that the Democrats would take back control of one or both Houses of
Congress.145  In the mid-term elections of 2002146 and the Presidential
election of 2004,147 the President and the Republican Party were able
to make substantial electoral gains by emphasizing their ability to deal
better with the terror threat than the Democrats.  With the 2002 and
2004 elections as the backdrop, the President and the Republican
Congress repeatedly stressed the need, in mid-September 2006, for
144. See Charles Babington & Jonathan Weisman, Senate Approves Detainee Bill Backed by
Bush; Constitutional Challenges Predicted, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2006, at A1 (detailing then-
Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert’s statements that, by opposing the MCA and other
Republican initiatives, Nancy Pelosi and House Democrats voted for “MORE rights for
terrorists” and “to protect the rights of terrorists”).  Then-House Majority Leader John
Boehner also stated that such opposition by the Democrats demonstrated an “‘irrational
opposition to strong national security policies.’” Id.; see also 152 CONG. REC. S10354, 10363
(statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein) (“I do not believe the bill before us is constitutional.
It is being rushed through a month before a major election in which the [Republican]
leadership of this very body is being challenged.”); Mark Mazzetti, C.I.A. Still Awaiting Rules
on Interrogating Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2007, § 1, at 14 (reporting on statements made
by President Bush in late October 2006 that the C.I.A. detention facilities have kept Ameri-
cans safe from terrorists).
145. Adam Nagourney & Janet Elder, Only 25% in Poll Voice Approval of the Congress, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2006, at A1.
146. Tom Freedman & Bill Knapp, Op-Ed., How Republicans Usurped the Center, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2002, at A31 (“Republicans used the insecurity and anxiety over terrorism to
win the midterm election.”).
147. See Nick Anderson, The Race for the White House: Bin Laden’s Image Crops Up in Ads,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2004, at 17 (“President Bush and his Republican allies have used the
terrorist images to paint Sen. John F. Kerry of Massachusetts as a weak leader.”).
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military tribunals to provide swift justice for terrorists to combat fu-
ture terror attacks.148
Of course, this sudden interest in quick process was belied by the
fact that not a single tribunal had entered the trial phase since their
establishment by Executive Order on November 13, 2001.  Nor was
any emphasis placed on the fact that of the over 700 detainees held at
Guantanamo since January 2002, only four had been charged with war
crimes by the time Hamdan had been decided.  Nor was it made clear
that the United States had actually obtained important terror-related
convictions and guilty pleas in federal district courts prior to Hamdan,
thereby demonstrating that traditional criminal processes were readily
available for purposes of retribution and example-setting.149
Nor was it clearly emphasized that the inability to bring any war
crimes charges against the detainees had nothing to do with whether
they would be released. Hamdi makes clear that if the United States
properly demonstrates that the detainees are unlawful enemy combat-
ants (as opposed to being guilty of war crimes), they can still be held
for the duration of the conflict.150  Indeed, even if the detainees were
declared prisoners of war and thus eligible for better treatment under
the Geneva Conventions, they would still be subject to detention until
hostilities ceased.151  In this regard, the public impression imparted by
supporters of the MCA was that in the absence of establishing valid
military commissions to comply with Hamdan, the UCMJ, and the Ge-
neva Conventions, detainees would have to be released.152
148. See Carl Hulse & Kate Zernike, House Passes Detainee Bill As It Clears Senate Hurdle,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2006, at A20 (relating the statement of then-majority leader Boehner
that “[i]t is outrageous that House Democrats, at the urging of their leaders, continue to
oppose giving President Bush the tools he needs to protect our country”).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 457–62 (4th Cir. 2004) (detailing
the arrest and trial procedures of 9/11 plotter Zacarias Moussaoui); United States v. Goba,
220 F. Supp. 2d 182, 196–223 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) (discussing the proffered government evi-
dence against five suspected terrorists in Western New York who attended a military train-
ing camp in Afghanistan); United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565, 566–70 (E.D. Va.
2002) (describing the training and actions of John Walker Lindh, the American member
of the Taliban, in Afghanistan).
150. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (plurality opinion).
151. See In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 146–48 (9th Cir. 1946) (holding lawful the military
detention, without trial, of a U.S. citizen who was, as a member of the Italian military
during World War II, a prisoner of war seized from the battlefield in Sicily and then held in
the United States even beyond the duration of hostility).
152. See, e.g., R. Jeffrey Smith, On Rough Treatment, a Rough Accord, WASH. POST, Sept. 23,
2006, at A6 (citing Bush Administration approval of the jurisdictional-stripping provisions
of the MCA “so that dangerous detainees could be subject to lengthy interrogations with-
out hope of release before military trials”).
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So with the mid-term elections in the background and the experi-
ence of using the terrorist threat as an effective election weapon, the
President and Congress had an open road before them in structuring
the MCA as a way to attempt to undercut substantially the law as the
Supreme Court found it in Hamdan.  Those members of Congress,
worried about the lawfulness of key provisions of the MCA, were re-
duced to emphasizing that the Supreme Court would have to “clean
up” what they believed to be the self-evidently unlawful provisions
within the MCA.153  Nor could those in the Senate who opposed seem-
ingly unlawful measures afford in that heightened political context to
employ stalling devices, such as the filibuster, to stop the process.154
As it turned out, neither the passage of the MCA nor any other
attempt to use the war on terror as a method of regaining the upper
political hand in the mid-term elections were successful.  While these
tactics did provide temporary traction for the President and his party
in September 2006,155 the unfolding of the congressional page scan-
dal and the role of Congressman Mark Foley therein, quickly undid
whatever benefit was provided by the MCA.156  Moreover, the war in
Iraq and congressional scandals involving the Republican leadership
continued to hold sway, and on November 7, 2006, the Democratic
Party was able to gain control of the both the House and the
Senate.157
As a result of new congressional leadership, there are prospects
that some of the harshest provisions of the MCA and detainee treat-
ment in general may be undone.  For example, Representative John
Murtha (D-PA), chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommit-
tee on Defense, has proposed eliminating appropriations to hold de-
153. See supra note 41. R
154. With forty-nine Senators voting against the provision barring habeas corpus as a
remedy within the MCA, there were certainly adequate votes to support a filibuster on that
issue alone.  However, it was clear in this intense political context that a filibuster would
have played into the hands of the President and the Republicans, in that it would have
risked raising an issue easily converted to the kind of political weapon that had undercut
Democratic incumbents and candidates in the 2002 and 2004 elections.
155. See Michael A. Fletcher, Bush Signs Terrorism Measure; New Law Governs Interrogation,
Prosecution of Detainees, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2006, at A4 (noting that Republicans, with
mid-term elections approaching, “immediately seized on the [MCA], which was opposed
by most Democratic lawmakers, as evidence of their commitment to protect the country
against terrorist attacks”).
156. See Scott Canon, Surprise! It’s Too Late for an October Surprise this Election Year, KAN.
CITY STAR, Oct. 29, 2006 (describing the series of negative events affecting Republicans
prior to the mid-term elections).
157. John M. Broder, Democrats Take Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2006, at A1 (“Democrats
gained control of the Senate on Thursday, giving them a majority in both houses of Con-
gress for the first time since 1994 . . . .”).
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tainees at the Guantanamo facility except the fourteen high level al
Qaeda operatives brought there from secret CIA prisons in Eastern
Europe by early September 2006.158  Reiterating his commitment to
closing the Guantanamo facility, Representative Murtha told National
Public Radio, “And certainly we can limit the funds for it, and that
would shut it down.”159
Senator Chris Dodd (D-CT) has introduced legislation to reverse
the habeas bar included within the MCA and other questionable pro-
visions therein.160  The change in the makeup of the Senate from the
time the MCA passed makes it more than likely that a majority of the
Senate would now reverse the 51-48 vote in 2006 in support of elimi-
nating habeas.  It may be, however, that this or any other change to
the MCA would require a super-majority given the prospect of a Re-
publican-led filibuster in the Senate or a presidential veto of any
change to the MCA.  Nevertheless, the MCA will undoubtedly be thor-
oughly reexamined in the new Congress.
VI. JUSTICE KENNEDY AND THE FUTURE OF THE MCA
To the extent that the MCA is not changed by the new Congress,
that statute raises a plethora of legal issues likely to be contested
within the federal courts.  For example:
• In the absence of “Cases of Rebellion or Invasion,” can
Congress suspend habeas corpus for the Guantanamo
detainees?161
158. See Editorial, Close the U.S. Prisons for Terrorism Suspects at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba?
Then What?, S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL, Feb. 22, 2007, at A20; see also Securing America’s Interests in
Iraq: The Remaining Options: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 110th Cong. 6
(2007) (statement of Rep. John P. Murtha, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Defense Appropri-
ations) (“I believe we should shut down the Guantanamo detention facility . . . .”), available
at http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2007/MurthaTestimony070123.pdf.
159. Morning Edition: Murtha Vows to Fight Bush Iraq Strategy (NPR radio broadcast Feb.
14, 2007).
160. Press Release, Senator Chris Dodd, Dodd Introduces Effective Terrorist Prosecu-
tion Act; Brings Terrorists to Justice, Honors America’s Good Name (Nov. 17, 2006), avail-
able at http://dodd.senate.gov/index.php?q=node/3661.  For a full description of
proposed changes to the MCA due to its harsh impact upon detainees, see Editorial, The
Must-Do List, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, § 4, at 11.
161. The Constitution provides that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.  There can be no doubt that neither rebellion nor
invasion justified the habeas bar in the MCA.  The D.C. Circuit upheld the bar by holding
that habeas protection did not reach aliens held outside the sovereign United States. See
Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007); see also
supra note 31 and accompanying text.  However, the D.C. Circuit, once again, has put “all R
of its eggs” in the Eisentrager “basket” to find that the habeas constitutional protections do
not extend outside the United States.  As noted earlier, the Supreme Court in Rasul went
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• Can Congress alter the protections of the Geneva Con-
ventions by:
° redefining “humiliating and degrading treatment,” to
encompass only intentional conduct designed to im-
pose, inter alia, serious bodily or permanent psycho-
logical injury?162
° eliminating the protections of Article 5 that ensure
meaningful determinations as to the combatant status
of detainees?163
° barring the Conventions from being the source of re-
medial actions?164
• Can Congress allow military judges to authorize the use
of “coerced” testimony for purposes of proving a violation
of the laws of war?165
As Professors Quint and Singer make clear,166 while the Hamdan
majority acknowledged Congress’s appropriate role in responding to
to great lengths to distinguish Eisentrager and find that the Guantanamo detainees had the
protection of the then-relevant habeas statute. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. R
While it is true that Rasul related to statutory interpretation of a federal statute (rather
than a determination of the reach of the Constitution’s habeas clause), it certainly would
not be a great leap for the Court to extend its Rasul analysis to find that the habeas consti-
tutional protection does reach Guantanamo, a facility that has all the attributes of U.S.
control. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 486–88 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Nor does the denial of certiorari in Boumediene detract from what is likely to be the
primacy of the courts in this area.  Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg,
dissented from that denial, making it clear that these Justices, inter alia, found persuasive
the argument that the extraterritorial reasoning of Rasul should apply to the habeas bar
for Guantanamo detainees within the MCA and that the provision was therefore constitu-
tionally suspect. Boumediene, 127 S. Ct. at 1479 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari).  Justices Stevens and Kennedy filed a statement accompanying the Boumediene
certiorari denial, saying that “[d]espite the obvious importance of the issues raised,” doc-
trines of constitutional avoidance and exhaustion led them to favor allowing the judicial
review procedures of the DTA to play out before Supreme Court consideration. Id. at 1478
(statement of Stevens & Kennedy, JJ.).  Indeed, besides stating that “as always, denial of
certiorari does not constitute an expression of any opinion on the merits,” they also
warned that any perceived inadequacy, unreasonable delay, “or some other and ongoing
injury,” would provide “alternative means . . . for us to consider our jurisdiction over the
allegations made by the petitioners before the Court of Appeals.” Id.  In sum, the collec-
tive writings of these five Justices accompanying the Boumediene certiorari denial make clear
that a decision on the constitutionality of the MCA habeas bar will likely be dealt with by
the Supreme Court on another day in the not too distant future.
162. See supra notes 49–58 and accompanying text. R
163. See supra note 18. R
164. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text (noting that the MCA barred the R
Geneva Conventions from being the basis of a cause of action against the United States).
Again, the Hamdan majority expressly left open the question whether the Conventions can
be self-enforcing.
165. See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text. R
166. See Singer, supra note 4, at 761; Quint, supra note 4, at 783–84. R
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its ruling, it did so with important strings attached.  Most importantly,
Justice Kennedy twice strongly implied that, while Congress may act, it
may not have the final say here, by stating in his concurrence:
If Congress, after due consideration, deems it appropriate to
change the controlling statutes, in conformance with the Consti-
tution and other laws, it has the power and prerogative to do
so.
. . . .
. . . Because Congress has prescribed these limits, Con-
gress can change them, requiring a new analysis consistent with
the Constitution and other governing laws. . . .167
Doubtless the Constitution will have much to say about eliminat-
ing habeas in the absence of rebellion or invasion for detainees held
“under the complete control and jurisdiction of the United States”168
or about convicting detainees of violations of the laws of war through
the use of coerced testimony.  That is especially the case, when the
Constitution is read—not with an eye to the next election (which was
the prevailing influence leading to the passage of the MCA)—but with
the critical eye of certain Justices on the United States’ jurisprudential
role within the civilized world as a beacon for the establishment and
support of the rule of law and human rights.  That same judicial influ-
ence will have much to say about the application of the Geneva Con-
ventions in this context, which after all, by virtue of the Constitution,
once ratified by the Senate, are a part of U.S. domestic law, whether
incorporated by statute or not.169
As Professor Singer has demonstrated,170 even Chief Justice Rob-
erts has strongly implied in another context that it is the federal
courts, and not Congress, who define what those treaties mean.  The
Hamdan majority certainly left open readings of the Geneva Conven-
tions that, as ratified by the Senate, may: make those treaties self-en-
forcing; protect against abusive detentions and interrogations; and
167. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2800, 2808 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part).
168. See supra note 31. R
169. As the Supremacy Clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Author-
ity of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
170. See Singer, supra note 4, at 766 (noting Chief Justice Roberts’s view that it is the R
duty of the Supreme Court to interpret approved treaties).
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assure appropriate determinations about the correct status of detain-
ees, i.e., whether they are unlawful combatants, prisoners of war, or
innocent civilians who, unfortunately found themselves in harm’s way.
What is clear, then, is that neither Hamdan nor the MCA provides
the final thoughts on the treatment of detainees in the war on terror,
and it is the Court, not Congress, that will likely have the last word.
